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ABSTRACT:  
One of the challenges faced by the engineering profession is to meet the energy requirement 
of an increasingly prosperous world. Nuclear power was considered as a reliable option until 
the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant (NPP) disaster which eroded the public 
confidence. This short paper shows that offshore wind turbines (due to its shape and form, 
i.e. heavy rotating mass resting at the top of a tall tower) have long natural vibration periods 
(>3.0 s) and are less susceptible to earthquake dynamics. The performance of near-shore wind 
turbines structures during the 2011 Tohoku earthquake are reviewed. It has been observed 
that they performed well. As NPPs are often sited close to the sea, it is proposed that a small 
wind farm capable of supplying emergency backup power along with a NPP can be a better 
safety system (robust and resilient system) in avoiding cascading failures and catastrophic 
consequences. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The world population is predicted to increase from 6 to 8 billion (i.e. 33% rise) between 2000 
and 2020. Accordingly, the demand for energy is set to increase by about 60% (IAEA 2002). 
While renewable energy sources, such as offshore marine sources (wind, wave, and tidal), 
onshore wind, and solar, are expanding, nuclear power is perceived to cover a significant 
proportion of the baseload supply. The advantage of nuclear energy is low CO2 emission and 
has a proven track record to deliver reliable power in most countries. The safety philosophy 
is critical for designing such structures especially in seismic zones (Bommer 2010). A dramatic 
change of the public risk perception towards nuclear energy has happened in the aftermath 
of the 2011 Tohoku earthquake due to the Fukushima Nuclear Power Plant (NPP) disaster. 
Further details of the 2011 Tohoku earthquake can be found in Bhattacharya et al. (2011) and 
Goda et al. (2013). In this context, it is noteworthy that India and China, which are situated in 
seismically active regions, are constructing Nuclear Power Plants to meet the increasing high 
energy demand.  
The scope of the article is to review the effects of 2011 Tohoku earthquake on two 
energy systems (Fukushima NPP and near shore offshore wind farms) operating at that time 
to see if any lessons can be learnt to make the NPP safety system more robust and resilient.   
 
SAFETY SYSTEMS OF NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS (NPP) 
According to the nuclear safety philosophy, buildings within a NPP are divided into safety-
related and non-safety related. Safety-related building structures include reactor building, 
auxiliary systems building, switchgear building, emergency backup generator building, or the 
vent stack building. The pressure vessels (for example prestressed concrete) of gas-cooled 
reactors and the containment buildings of PWR (Pressurised Water Reactor) and BWR (Boiling 
Water Reactor) are the key safety related structures. In certain design, such as BWR (Boiling 
Water Reactor), the turbine building is also classified as safety-related, as radioactive live 
steam is fed directly into the turbine. In particular, the reactor is a critical component and the 
safety barrier systems consists of: (a) fuel pellets; (b) fuel rod cladding; (c) reactor pressure 
vessel; (d) reinforced concrete cylinder as radiation shield often known as biological shield; 
(e) containment; and (f) reinforced concrete shell. On the other hand, non-safety related 
building structures typically include administrative and workshop buildings, gatehouse, and 
cooling towers.  
 
For the purpose of safety evaluation, IAEA (2002) safety standards recommend that seismic 
input level should be considered for SL-2 (Seismic Level 2) which corresponds to an infrequent 
earthquake with a return period of 10,000 years (10-4 per year). This is considered by plant 
developers as a bottom-line event, i.e. the most onerous event for which the bottom-line 
plant provides protection. Apart from SL-2, the IAEA also recommends for SL-1 (Seismic Level 
1) which corresponds to less severe and more likely earthquakes with a probability of 10-2 per 
year being exceeded. 
The safety philosophy in NPPs is highly redundant and essentially designed for the 
following three main scenarios: (a) control reactivity of the nuclear fuel, safe shut-down and 
reactor trip and post-trip cooling; (b) cooling fuel assemblies; and (c) controlling radioactive 
substances and radiation from release to the atmosphere. The safety systems are designed 
for internal incidents (for example, internal flooding or loss of coolant) as well as external 
actions (for example, floods, earthquake, and tsunamis). To meet these safety goals, different 
types of active and passive safety barriers and systems are adopted where the guiding safety 
principles are redundancy, diversity and spatial separation. Redundancy allows the main 
safety systems to be replicated so that if one of the systems fails, another can take over. This 
corresponds to at least two lines of protection for design load case of SL-1 and at least one 
line of protection for SL-2. Through the diversity principle, major components of the main 
safety systems are made to different designs so that they don’t fail at the same time due to a 
common cause or same reason. Finally, spatial separation ensures that major components of 
the redundant safety systems are spaced or located in such a way that if an incident occurs, 
it has no impact on the other identical redundant modules and that these modules can take 
over the safety function. 
 It is of interest to review the Fukushima NPP disaster in the light of above safety concepts. 
 
 
FUKUSHIMA DAIICHI DISASTER  
The Fukushima Daiichi NPP consists of six BWR units in the plant and were constructed in 
1970s. The working principle is as follows: heat is generated by nuclear fission which 
transforms water into steam driving a turbine to generate electricity. The critical safety aspect 
of the whole system is avoiding the melting of the reactor and leaking of radioactive materials 
to the atmosphere. In this regard, one of the important safety aspect is the cooling system 
and during the earthquake, there was a loss of external power supply due to the combined 
events of ground shaking and tsunami.  
The earthquake and its triggered hazards (i.e. tsunami and landslide) initiated the crisis of the 
Fukushima Daiichi NPP. The tsunami, which arrived around 50 minutes following the 
mainshock, was about 14m high which overwhelmed the 6m high sea walls and resulted in 
flooding the emergency generator rooms causing the power failure of reactor cooling 
systems. The loss of the cooling systems led to reactor heating up and subsequent meltdown, 
consequently, harmful radioactive materials were released to the environment. The power 
failure also meant that many of the safety control systems were not operational. The release 
of radioactive materials caused a large scale evacuation of over 300,000 people near the plant 
and the clean-up costs are estimated to be in the order of hundreds of billions of dollars. 
The events leading to the triple meltdown can be described as follows:  
(a) During the 2011 Tohoku earthquake, the switching station for Unit 1&2 was damaged 
by the shaking, whereas the transmission tower that connects the regional substation 
and Reactors 5 and 6 collapsed due to a landslide (note: Reactors 5 and 6 did not 
experience the complete loss of power because emergency generators were 
functional). 
(b) Additionally, after 14+m tsunami (Mw9.0 event) arrived at the plant, whereas the sea 
walls were only 6.5m high (designed based on a Mw8.2 event). As a result, Reactors 1-
4 were inundated by the tsunami and lost the emergency diesel generators, DC 
batteries, and sea-water pumping systems, which were located at the basement of 
the reactor buildings.  
(c) Power supply was lost which was critical for pumping cooling water and as a result 
Reactors 1-3 experienced meltdown.  
 
 
PERFORMANCE OF NEAR-SHORE WIND FARM DURING THE 2011 TOHOKU EARTHQUAKE 
Figure 1 shows the location of the earthquake and the operating wind farms in the Kanto and 
Tohoku regions of Japan. The earthquake and the associated effects, such as liquefaction and 
tsunami, caused great economic loss, loss of life and tremendous damage to structures and 
national infrastructures (Goda et al. 2013), but very little damage to the wind farms. Figure 2 
shows photographs of a wind farm at Kamisu (Hasaki) after the earthquake. Immediately after 
the earthquake, the wind turbines were automatically shut down (like all escalators or lifts), 
and following an inspection they were restarted. Figure 3 shows the collapse of pile-
supported building at Onagawa. At many locations (e.g. Natori, Ofunato and Onagawa), 
tsunami heights exceeded 10m, and sea walls and other coastal defence systems failed to 
prevent the disaster (Fraser et al. 2013).  
      
 
Figure 1: Details of the 2011 Tohoku earthquake and locations of the wind farms 
 
 Figure 2: Photograph of the Kamisu (Hasaki) wind farm following the 2011 Tohoku 
earthquake 
 
Figure 3: Collapse of a pile-supported building in Onagawa 
Recorded ground acceleration time-series data in two directions [North-South(NS) and East-
West (EW)] near Kamisu and Hiyama wind farms (FKSH 19 and IBRH20) are presented in Figure 
1. The observed peak ground accelerations near Hiyama were large, exceeding 0.6g. Figure 4 
shows the response spectra of the recorded ground motions at FKSH 19 and IBRH20. The 
dominant period ranges of the recorded ground motions near the wind farm sites were less 
than 1.0 second. Importantly, natural vibration periods of offshore wind turbine systems are 
in the range of 3.0 seconds, significantly longer than the dominant spectral content of the 
recorded ground motions. Due to non-overlapping, these structures will not get tuned and as 
a result they are relatively insensitive to earthquake shaking. Nevertheless, earthquake-
induced effects, such as liquefaction, may cause some damages to their foundations.  
Figure 5 shows a structural/mechanical model of an Offshore Wind Turbine Structure where 
the foundation is represented by three springs: lateral 𝐾𝐿, rotational 𝐾𝑅 and cross 𝐾𝐿𝑅 
stiffness. The tower can be idealised by equivalent bending stiffness and mass per length 
following and can be modelled using two beam theories: Euler-Bernoulli and Timoshenko. 
Timoshenko beam theory accounts for shear deformation and the effect of rotational inertia 
and the nacelle and rotor assembly is modelled as a top head mass with mass moment of 
inertia. Due to the rigidity of the foundation when compared to the tower, the resonant 
frequency is very close to fixed base frequency, see Arany et al (2015). Other aspects related 
to dynamic soil-structure interaction of the system can be found in Bhattacharya and Adhikari 
(2011), Bhattacharya (2014).   
 
Figure 4: Power spectra of the earthquake and natural vibration period of wind turbines 
.  
 
 
Figure 5 – Mechanical model of a wind turbine. 
DISCUSSION 
One may argue, had there been a few offshore wind turbines operating, the crisis may have 
been averted or the scale of the disaster could have been reduced. The wind turbines, by 
supplying power to the emergency cooling systems, could have prevented the reactor 
meltdown. In this context, it is interesting to note that there are plans to replace the 
Fukushima Daiichi NPP by a floating wind farm [Fukushima Forward] where 2MW semi-sub 
floating turbine is under operation. Another 7MW oil-pressure-drive type wind turbine on a 
three-column semi-sub floater has also recently been tested.  
A NPP installation is complex structure where one structure is inside another structure 
and are structurally connected. During an earthquake, various components interact 
dynamically and the connecting parts are vital to maintain the integrity and safety of the 
whole installation. Analysis of whole system therefore requires an integrated structural 
analysis not only for the static forces (mainly dead loads) but also for thermal and gas pressure 
actions together with the dynamic actions of the earthquakes. In the case of Fukushima NPP, 
post-earthquake analysis showed that BWR themselves did not significantly contribute to the 
accident. Triggered by the earthquake and as per design, the control rods of the BWR reactor 
were automatically inserted by the hydraulic pressure from underneath the pressure vessel 
despite the fact that the seismic acceleration were beyond design basis earthquake. However 
the accident was due to prolonged loss of electrical power with almost no instrumentation 
and control system to secure the safety of the six reactors and six nuclear fuel ponds, a 
common fuel pools and dry cask storage facilities. Coatsworth [2011] suggested that the 
accident had shown the need for mobile power. Therefore, by comparing two energy systems 
(one very operationally complex and vulnerable to earthquake and the other is resilient to 
earthquake), it appears that the combination of two can achieve robustness of the complex 
future energy system.      
REFERENCES 
1. Arany L, Bhattacharya S, Adhikari S, et al (2015): An analytical model to predict the natural frequency 
of offshore wind turbines on three-spring flexible foundations using two different beam models. Soil 
Dyn Earthq Eng 74:40–45. doi: 10.1016/j.soildyn.2015.03.007 
2. S. Bhattacharya, J. A. Cox, D. Lombardi, and D. M. Wood Muir Wood, “Dynamics of offshore wind 
turbines supported on two foundations,” Proc. ICE - Geotech. Eng., vol. 166, no. 2, pp. 159–169, Apr. 
2013. 
3. S. Bhattacharya and S. Adhikari (2011): “Experimental validation of soil–structure interaction offshore 
wind turbines,” Soil Dyn. Earthq. Eng., vol. 31, no. 5–6, pp. 805–816, May 2011. 
4. Coatsworth A (2011) Great East Japan Earthquake: Nuclear accident and lessons in resilience, pp 7 to 
12, Volume 23, No 2, SECED Newsletter, ISSN 0967-859X 
5. Bhattacharya, S., Hyodo, M., Goda, K., Tazoh, T., and Taylor, C. A. (2011). Liquefaction of soil in the 
Tokyo Bay area from the 2011 Tohoku (Japan) earthquake. Soil Dynamics & Earthquake Engineering, 
31(11), 1618-1628. 
6. Bommer J.J. (2010). Seismic hazard Assessment for nuclear power plant sites in the UK: challenges 
and possibilities, Nuclear Future, 6(3), 164-170. 
7. Fraser, S., Pomonis, A., Raby, A., Goda, K., Chian, S. C., Macabuag, J., Offord, M., Saito, K., and 
Sammonds, P. (2013). Tsunami damage to coastal defences and buildings in the March 11th 2011 
Mw9.0 Great East Japan earthquake and tsunami. Bulletin of Earthquake Engineering, 11(1), 205-239. 
8. Goda, K., Pomonis, A., Chian, S. C., Offord, M., Saito, K., Sammonds, P., Fraser, S., Raby, A., and 
Macabuag, J. (2013). Ground motion characteristics and shaking damage of the 11th March 2011 
Mw9.0 Great East Japan earthquake. Bulletin of Earthquake Engineering, 11(1), 141-170. 
9. IAEA (2002). International Atomic Energy Agency, Evaluation of Seismic Hazards for Nuclear Power 
Plants, Safety Standards Series No NS-G-3.3, IAEA, Vienna.  
10. Fukushima Forward Pamphlet [http://www.fukushima-forward.jp/pdf/pamphlet3.pdf] accessed on 
30th Sep 2015 
 
 
